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SCHOOL BOOKS, LESSON PLANS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
FREDERICK

I.

F.

SCHAUER*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a rebirth of controversy and
attention regarding the choice of school books, teaching methods,
and curricula in the public schools. The school book controversy
in West Virginia is a matter of common knowledge. Many states
have enacted or are considering enactment of statutes or regulations governing the ways in which biology, history, and other subjects are taught. The introduction of sex education courses has
caused much public concern. New textbooks which contain modern, and frequently unpopular or controversial, readings have been
introduced. Non-traditional teaching methods have become much
more common. And, as a background to all of this, the rights of
school children and the rights of school teachers have been expanded by recent decisions of the state and federal courts.
Quite clearly, there are significant political and policy arguments regarding the substance of what goes on in the public school
classroom. Questions of educational philosophy and the role of the
public schools proliferate. But there are also significant constitutional questions, and the exploration of these constitutional issues
is the purpose of this article. First, the concept of academic freedom will be discussed. As between school teacher and school
board, who has the ultimate power in choice of teaching methods
and materials? Are these powers subject to constitutional restrictions? Is there a "right to teach"? The next section will be an
analysis of the substantive constitutional restrictions on what can
be taught. This section will deal primarily with freedom of religion.
Does the establishment clause prohibit the public schools from
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; A.B.,
1967, and M.B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
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teaching certain subjects or teaching in certain ways? Does the free
exercise clause also serve as a restriction in this area? Finally, the
rights of parents and school children will be discussed. Particularly, is there a right not to attend the public schools if certain
subjects or teaching methods are part of the curriculum? If so, is
this choice that of the parents or that of the children?
There are, of course, no easy answers to any of these questions,
and it is not the purpose of this article to provide simple solutions.
But an understanding of all of the constitutional implications of
choice of school books and teaching methods should make it easier
to establish procedures for the making of these choices in such a
way that some accommodation of many competing interests is
possible.
II.

WHO MAKES THE

CHOICE?-THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM

The starting point for this examination of the constitutional
aspects of choice of teaching methods and teaching materials must
be the concept of academic freedom, for it is this which determines
who makes the choice of what goes on in the classroom. Any attempt to analyze substantive constitutional restrictions on the
choice of curriculum and choice of books must be based on a prior
understanding of the locus of the decision.
Academic freedom is a concept far broader than that merely
of the teacher's power to decide on instructional methods and materials.' Numerous definitions are available,' but for the present
I See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1045 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and
Professors, 1970 DuE L.J. 841 (1970); Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging
ConstitutionalRight, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
MURPHY]; Cowan, Interference With Academic Freedom: The Pre-Natal History
of a Tort, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 205 (1958); Fellman, Academic Freedom in American
Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 3 (1961); Moskowitz and Casagrande, Teachers and the
FirstAmendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies
Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 661 (1975); Comment, Academic
Freedom-Its ConstitutionalContext, 40 U. COLO. L. REv. 600 (1968); 55 MARQ. L.
REV. 379 (1972); Jones, The American Concept of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE 224 (L. Joughin ed. 1967); R. HOFSTADTER and W. METZGER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); R. KIRK,
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1955); R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME (1955); cf.

Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
2 See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 451-52.
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purpose it is sufficient to define it as the idea of the teacher's
freedom from external control in order to foster free discussion and
interchange of ideas in an academic environment. Academic freedom can be separated into three components. One is the freedom
of a teacher or professor in his or her life outside of. the academic
environment, such as freedom from control 3 as to personal lifestyle,
personal beliefs or opinions, membership in organizations, and
freedom of expression away from the academic setting. Second
would be freedom of belief, action, and speech in the academic
setting but outside of the classroom. Finally, there is academic
freedom as the freedom to choose course content, course materials,
and instructional methods or styles. It is, of course, the last of the
three that is most relevant to this article, but an understanding of
this requires an understanding of the other two forms of academic
freedom. Naturally, none of these forms of academic freedom are
absolutes, and this discussion is a presentation of the dimensions
of, and restrictions on, academic freedom in each of these three
contexts.
A. Academic Freedom and Out-of-School Activities of Teachers
and Professors
Much of today's body of law relating to academic freedom is
derived from a series of United States Supreme Court cases which
rejected the formalistic notions of the right-privilege distinction.'
The right-privilege distinction, in its clearest form, stood for the
proposition that public employment, being a privilege and not a
right, could be granted on the condition that the grantee forfeit
what would otherwise be constitutional rights. Thus, in McAuliffe
v. Mayor of City of New Bedford,5 Mr. Justice Holmes, while a
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, said that
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman ....

The

servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the
terms which are offered to him.
Control may be direct control, but also includes qualifications for hiring,
promotion, and retention.
I See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968); 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 7.11-7.13 (1958, Supp. 1970).
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
6 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
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And the Supreme Court in 1952 expressed its agreement in remarkably similar terms in upholding a New York law declaring ineligible as public school teachers those who advocated the overthrow
of the government or published materials so advocating, or organized or was a member of any group with those beliefs.7
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to
assemble, speak, think and believe as they will ....
It is
equally clear that they have no right to work for the State in
the school system on their own terms ....
They may work for
the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down by the
proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work
on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived
them of any right to free speech or assembly? We think not.'
In these and many other cases the recipients of governmental
benefits or employment were held to be at the mercy of the public
employer, or public authority dispensing the benefits, and thus
limitations on substantive rights were constitutionally acceptable.,
But in the last twenty-five years, courts have been virtually unanimous in rejecting the right-privilege distinction when it was used
to justify a restriction on specifically protected constitutional
rights. In most of the cases, first amendment rights have been
protected against indirect infringement via the right-privilege distinction. The first inclination of movement in this direction came
0
in Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc."
Congress had provided that the
second class mailing privilege was to be restricted to only those
This was the "Feinberg Law," N.Y. Laws 1949, ch. 360 § 12-a.
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). The opinion of the Court
of Appeals of New York specifically followed and quoted the McAuliffe epigram.
Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 490, 95 N.E.2d 806, 812 (1950).
1 E.g., in Willkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941),
welfare benefits were terminated because the recipient insisted on sleeping on a bed
of rags in an old barn. "Appellant also argues that he has a right to live as he pleases
while being supported by public charity. One could admire his independence if he
were not so dependent, but he has no right to defy the standards and conventions
of civilized society while being supported at public expense. This is true even
though some of those conventions may be somewhat artificial." 261 App. Div. at
375, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 619. See also Davis v. Massachusetts, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39
N.E. 113, 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (Holmes, J.) (since City of Boston
could completely deny access to the Boston Common, it could therefore limit free
speech on the Common); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 109, 289 S.W. 363, 364
(1927).
10327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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publications which the Postmaster General found to be in the public interest. The promulgation of standards was left entirely to the
discretion of the Postmaster General. In overturning the statute,
the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a privilege did
not give Congress the right to indirectly impose censorship which
would otherwise be in violation of the first amendment.
Four years later, in Communications Association v. Douds,'2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, observed that:
Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life, but
if it affords them it cannot make them available in an obviously
arbitrary way or exact surrender of freedoms unrelated to the
purpose of the facilities.'3 (emphasis added).

While this statement may appear somewhat revolutionary for
1950, especially in light of the Court's 1952 opinion regarding the
freedom of New York school teachers,'4 by the proviso that the
surrender of freedoms be "unrelated to the purpose of the facilities," Mr. Justice Frankfurter merely stated what should have
been obvious even at the time, namely, that pushed to the extreme, the right-privilege distinction could justify an abrogation of
virtually every constitutional right. For example, the distinction
may even be taken as justifying a program by the government to
deny public employment on racial or religious grounds, a position
which was clearly untenable even in 1950.'1
One outgrowth of the McCarthy era was the opportunity it
gave the courts to deal with a wide range of first amendment restrictions on the right of government to dispose or withdraw government benefits, particularly public employment. In Wieman v.
Updegraff," a college teacher was fired for failing to take a loyalty
oath which included broad assertions as to non-membership in or
non-affiliation with subversive organizations. Finding that this
oath unduly restricted the right to free association, the Court said:
" Id. at 156.
12339 U.S. 382 (1950). The decision upheld one of the anti-communist provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120 § 9(h), 61
Stat. 146 (1947) (repealed 1959).
" 339 U.S. at 415 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" See note 8 supra.
" See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
" 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See generally Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty
Oaths, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 487 (1963).
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We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimina7
tory.'
A similar rationale was followed in Shelton v. Tucker," which
struck down an Arkansas statute requiring public school teachers
to file annually an affidavit listing all organizations to which they
belonged. Although the effect on first amendment rights was less
direct than in Wieman, the Court nonetheless found something
akin to a "chilling effect" on associational rights.'"
A more recent case is Keyishian v. Board of Regents,2" which
overturned the dismissal of college professors who had refused to
sign non-communist affidavits. The Court explicitly rejected the
notion that public employment might be conditioned on the surrender of first amendment speech or associational rights." In doing
so, the Court specifically rejected Adler v. Board of Education" as
being based on outmoded constitutional doctrines.? The same
logic was followed in Pickering v. Board of Education," where a
teacher had been dismissed for writing a letter to a newspaper
criticizing the school board and the superintendant of schools.
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled
to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise
enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which
they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally
rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court."
,7344 U.S. at 192.

364 U.S. 479 (1960). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
The late Professor Bickel criticized this decision in some detail, arguing that
it overly restricted the state's power to examine teacher qualifications. A. BICKEL,
"
"

THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 51-54 (1962).
20 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
21 Id. at 605-06.

- 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
1 385 U.S. at 595. The bar-exclusion cases have also rejected the view that bar
admission may be conditioned on the applicant's exercise of his first amendment
rights. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Application of Stolar, 401
U.S. 23 (1971). But the concept of character investigations has been upheld. Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
24 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568.
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The cases have not been limited to restrictions on rights of
speech and association. In Slochower v. Board of Education,28 a
teacher had been fired for invoking the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination before a Senate committee. In finding
an unconstitutional restriction on this fifth amendment right, the
Court found irrelevant the fact that an individual has no right to
public employment."7 And in McLaughlin v. Tilendis," the Seventh Circuit held that although there was no right to public employment, a public employee could not be dismissed for joining or
helping to organize a labor union. This, it was held, would create
an unconstitutional burden on the independent right to join and
form a union. 9
In this line of cases, one common theme comes through. The
state may not use the right-privilege distinction to justify an indirect limitation on specifically protected constitutional rights and
thereby escape the reach of the protection of those rights. The state
may not do through the doctrine of privilege what it is prohibited
from doing directly. Thus, the fact of employment as a teacher or
professor may not allow restrictions on the out-of-school activities
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
2 See also Ault Unemployment Compensation Case, 398 Pa. 250, 157 A.2d 375
(1960) (unemployment compensation may not be denied because of refusal to answer questions regarding Communist affiliation). But see Nelson v. Los Angeles
County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960), where the Court upheld the dismissal of social workers
who had specifically disobeyed an order to answer questions at a subversive activities hearing. The Court distinguished Slochower by saying that in that case the
statute had provided for automatic dismissal of anyone invoking the fifth amendment, whereas in Nelson there was a specific act of insubordination. But since the
order had the same effect as the New York statute in Slochower, it is hard to accept
the distinction. Cf. Schlesinger v. Gates, 249 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 939 (1958) (contractor debarred from obtaining further government contracts after refusal to answer questions before Senate subcommittee; debarment
upheld because of past defaults in performance).
Slochower was followed in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), where
the Court disallowed the dismissal of policemen for refusal to answer questions
about alleged ticket fixing, and in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), disallowing the disbarment of an attorney who refused to produce his financial records and
refused to testify at a professional misconduct investigation. See also Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), and Uniformed Sanitationmen's Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
The court found that the right to form and join a union was a first amendment right, citing, inter alia, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), and Hague
v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
See also Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
28
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of the individual which would not otherwise be permitted." But,
like all other principles in this area, there are limitations on this
concept. In Pickering v. Board of Education,3 where public criticism of the school board was permitted by the Supreme Court, the
Court specifically noted that there was no showing of any effect on
classroom duties" and no showing that these statements were any
evidence of lack of fitness on the part of the teacher. 3 It is clear
that if out-of-class activities can be shown to have a direct effect
on the teacher's classroom performance, then appropriate restrictions on certain out-of-class activities would be justified, and similarly, if public criticism of a superior would undermine an ongoing
and close working relationship, this criticism may be prohibited."
Thus, the true test is the relationship of the challenged activity to
the official duties of the teacher or the professor. If there is no such
relationship, or the relationship is highly attenuated, then such
restrictions are impermissible. But if the outside activities can be
shown to impair the teacher's ability to teach, then reasonable
restrictions on those activities have been upheld. 5
B. Restrictionson School-Related But Out-of-Class Activities
It was seen in the previous subsection that permissible restrictions on the out-of-school activities of teachers and professors
increase as a direct correlation can be shown between those activities and performance of the teacher's duties. A fortiori, when those
10See Comment, Personality Control and Academic Freedom, 1975 UTAH L.
REv. 234 (1975), discussing, inter alia, Rarnpey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). See also Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359
F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), afl'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (homosexual teachers
may not be barred on that account), noted at 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 92 (1973).
31 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32 Id. at 572-73.
3

3,

Id. at 573 n.5.
Cases applying the Pickeringrationale to uphold or reject restrictions on out-

of-class activities include Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63
(N.D. Ind. 1970); Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969), cert.

denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970); Pietrunti v. Board of Educ., 128 N.J. Super. 149, 319
A.2d 262, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1057 (1974); Hostrop v. Board of Junior Colleges,
337 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill.) rev'd 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 967 (1973).
" Compare Morrison v. Board of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1969) and Jarvella v. Willougbly-Eastlake City School Dist., 12 Ohio

Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (Comm. Pl. 1967) with Horosko v. School Dist., 335 Pa.
369, 6 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 (1939) and Gover v. Stovall, 237 Ky. 172,
35 S.W.2d 24 (1931).
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activities take place in the school or on the campus, the courts
have held that permissible restrictions on speech and speechrelated activities are even greater. It is clear that the teacher's
responsibilities and duties are not solely within the classroom.
Therefore, if one accepts the obvious proposition that some restrictions on speech and other protected activities are permissible
while the employee is performing his or her duties,36 then greater
restrictions are allowable as to activities in the school setting than
as to activities wholly unrelated to the teacher's duties. Thus,
sanctions have been held to be constitutionally permissible
against a teacher as a result of inflammatory or divisive statements
made in staff meetings and in the teachers lounge."7 Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit has held valid a prohibition against controversial
speeches made at student rallies during school hours." And a federal court in Missouri upheld disciplinary action against a teacher
whose speeches to students were found expressly to impede school
policy by interfering with R.O.T.C. recruiting at the school. But
these cases should not be taken to indicate that any and all restrictions on teacher activity during school hours, or on campus, are
free from constitutional considerations. In Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,4 the Supreme Court
upheld, on first amendment grounds, the right of students to wear
armbands, as a protest against the Vietnam War, during school
hours.' In the course of its decision, the Court noted that
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. 2
11While McAuliffe might very well be decided differently today, there is no
doubt that McAuliffe could validly be prohibited from making his political
speeches while directing traffic.
1, Amburgey v. Cassady, 370 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
, Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist., 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973).
, Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd,
491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. Glover v. Daniel, 318 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), aff'd, 434 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970).
40 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" This case is also significant

for its discussion of the problem of "symbolic
speech." See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol of an
American flag is form of protected expression) and United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (prohibition of draft card burning not aimed at expression and
therefore valid). See generally Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under
the FirstAmendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29 (1973).
42 393 U.S. at 506. Compare the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, 393
U.S. at 522.
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Applying this aspect of Tinker, lower courts have upheld a
limited right of free expression during school hours for teachers and
professors. Thus, it has been held that teachers, as well as students, have a right to wear protest armbands during school hours.43
The Second Circuit has also upheld the right of a school teacher
to refuse to salute the flag, although leading the class in the flag
salute was nominally part of the teacher's duties." And a New
Jersey court overturned an attempted restriction on the discussion
of salary and related matters by teachers with students, primarily
on prior restraint grounds. 5
In determining, therefore, the allowability of restrictions on
speech-related activities which take place in the school but outside
of the classroom, both Pickering and Tinker provide the touchstones for the analysis. If the activity would, in other settings, be
clearly constitutionally protected, if it is not disruptive of school
activities or school administration, and if it is not obstructive of
the educational purpose and policies of the school, then it should
generally be allowed. But if the activity, even if speech or some
other constitutionally protected activity, is actually disruptive, or
is in fact a challenge to or obstructive of clearly defined educational or administrative policies of the school, then that activity
may properly be restricted by either administrative regulation or
appropriate disciplinary action.
C.

Restrictions on Classroom Teaching

With the foregoing as background, it is time to turn to the crux
of this section. What is the permissible scope of restrictions on
classroom teaching, or, stated in another way, what is the extent
of the concept of academic freedom when applied to the actual
teaching activities of the teacher or professor?"6 Since the emphasis
11James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
" Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 932 (1973). See also Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn.
1970). These cases, of course, grant to teachers the same privilege which was given
to students in West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
" River Dell Educ. Ass'n v. River Dell Bd. of Educ., 122 N.J. Super. 350, 300
A.2d 361 (1973). See also Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 908 (1974).
4' See generally Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Class.
room: A Searchfor Standards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, Controversy in
the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEo.
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here is with the exact and defined duties of the teacher, it is clear
now that the scope of constitutional protection is narrowest in this
area. "In the first place, the free speech clause of the first
amendment, though a logical textual source of a constitutional
right of academic freedom, is of questionable relevance to speech
in public elementary or secondary school classrooms.",, But this is
exactly opposite of the earliest origins of the concept of academic
freedom, the Lehrfreiheit 6f the German universities in the nineteenth century, which gave virtually unlimited freedom to the individual professor in the classroom, but granted no protection
against restrictions on activities outside of the classroom."8 With
the first amendment providing general protection for speech and
associational rights, however, American academic freedom developed primarily in the area of restriction on the allowable area of
control over non-classroom activities. But this protection relates
not only to general first and fourteenth amendment rights, but also
to the particular function of the teacher in our society. Thus, in a
number of cases, the Supreme Court related the teacher's protection against interference with outside activities to the teacher's
function in the classroom. In Wieman v. Updegraff,"'one of the
loyalty oath cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented as follows:
But, in view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of
teachers brings the safeguards of those amendments vividly into
operation. Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of
teachers affects not only those who, like the appellants, are
WASH. L. REv. 1032 (1971); Nahmod, FirstAmendment Protectionfor Learningand
Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479 (1972); Le Clercq,
The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption? 27 VAND. L.
Rav. 209, 232-37 (1974); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right
to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176 (1973). See also authorities cited in note 1 supra.
The entire concept of academic freedom was ridiculed in Jones v. Board of Control,
131 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1961).
11Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1053
(1968). This, of course, is an oversimplification, as the remainder of this section
will show, but virtually every free speech and public employment case in the last
thirty years has supported the proposition that free speech rights are less when
attempted to be exercised during the actual performance of duties.
" Developments, supra note 47, at 1048-49; Note, Academic Freedom, supra
note 46, at 1177-79.
4' 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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immediately before the Court. It has an unmistakable tendency
to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought
especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and
timidity in their associations by potential teachers 0
His thesis, which as an abstract proposition cannot be seriously
questioned, is that selection of teachers on political grounds, or on
the basis of lack of exercise of free speech rights, results in a uniformity and conformity within the academic community, a situation incompatible with the concept of an academic institution as
a center for the interchange of ideas, both in and out of the classroom. This theme recurs in other cases. In Shelton v. Tucker,5' the
Supreme Court, in invalidating an Arkansas statute requiring all
teachers to file an affidavit listing all organizations to which they
belonged, noted that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.""2 That academic freedom generally has first amendment origins was made clear in Keyishian v. Board of Regents."
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 51
Keyishian is one of few Supreme Court cases to relate academic
freedom directly to what goes on in the classroom, and to the
function of classroom education. Thus, although the Court has
consistently recognized the concept of academic freedom, 5 the
only case even remotely dealing with classroom academic freedom
is Sweezy v. New Hampshire." Sweezy involved an investigation
Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5' 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
52Id. at 487.

385 U.S. 589 (1967).
at 603.

5' Id.

5 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (opinion of Harlan,
- 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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as a result of a number of activities by a university professor, but
the most significant was a lecture delivered in class at the University of New Hampshire. Noting the importance of an interchange
of ideas and opinions in the classroom, the Supreme Court went
on to say that
We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression-areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread.57
Thus, the only Supreme Court case to deal with classroom
academic freedom dealt with it on the university level. It may not
be wholly appropriate to draw the facile analogy between college
level education and elementary and secondary education. We have
accepted the idea that the university is a marketplace of ideas, and
that is one of the functions of university education. As Sweezy and
other cases show, this function has even been elevated to a constitutional position, so ingrained is it in the conception of the function of higher education. But the purposes of elementary and secondary education in the public schools"8 are far from clear. A century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville commented that "[i]n
the United States, politics are the end and aim of education."59 In
its exhaustive 1968 study of academic freedom, the Harvard Law
Review contrasted the purposes of elementary and secondary education with those of higher education.
The assumptions of the "free marketplace of ideas" on which
freedom of speech rests do not apply to school-aged children,
especially in the classroom where the word of the teacher may
57Id. at 250.

5'This article is, of course, concerned with public elementary and secondary
schools, and not with private schools. To the extent that rights to academic freedom
are constitutionally based, there is a requirement that any deprivation be by state
action before a constitutional claim could be located. There are, however, circumstances under which state involvement in private education is such as to subject
the private institution to the requirements of the Constitution. This problem of
state action and the private educational institution has arisen most often in the
context of procedural due process requirements in colleges and universities. See
generally Hendrickson, "State Action" and Private Higher Education, 2 J.L. &
EDuc. 53 (1973); Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RUTG. L.
REV. 323 (1970); Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students; Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120 (1974).
3 Quoted in Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARv. EDUc. REV. 567, 569 (1971). See also 3 J. BRYCE,
THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 276-77 (1891).
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carry great authority. It seems unwise to assume as a matter of
constitutional doctrine that school children possess sufficient
sophistication or experience to distinguish "truth" from "falsity." Furthermore, since one function of elementary and even
secondary education is iidoctrinative-to transmit to succeeding generations the body of knowledge and set of values shared
by members of the community-some measure of public regulation of classroom speech is inherent in the very provision of
public education. 3
But this view of education in the public schools is clearly not
universally accepted.
The catalytic factor seems to have been acceptance of the view
that the primary purpose of education is intellectual stimulation. If this proposition seems self-evident, it should be remembered that, for centuries, education was viewed as primarily an
6t
inculcation of social and moral values.
The primary function of the public school should be to encourage students to develop an appropriate methodology for engaging in intellectual inquiry."
It is obvious that there exists considerable division of opinion
as to whether an elementary or secondary school should be a place
for the development of intellectual methodology, or on the other
hand a place for the indoctrination of specific facts, specific knowledge, and specific views. The real question, however, is not which
of these philosophies is correct. The question is whether the choice
of philosophies is one of constitutional proportion. Is the elementary or secondary classroom a locus of the marketplace of ideas? If
so, then there may be some degree of first amendment protection
for the concept of academic freedom. But if the classroom is a place
for indoctrination, or inculcation of facts or specific knowledge,
then the teacher's individual freedom of expression in the classroom is of little relevance. While it is true that the state may not
ignore first amendment considerations in deciding on the use to
11Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1053
(1968). See also James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
11Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176, 1177 (1973).
"2Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second
Consumption? 27 VAND. L. REV. 209, 235 (1974). This article views the indoctrinative theory of education as "authoritarian." "A school should not be like a hospital
or a jail." Id. at 235 n.158.
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which its facilities are placed,13 it is equally true that all public
property is not per se open to first amendment activity.64 The test
seems to be whether or not allowance of first amendment activity
would be compatible or incompatible with the primary purpose of
the facility.' 5 But saying this may not make the problem any easier, for who is it that decides what is the primary purpose of the
facility? A state can say, as in Adderley v. Florida,6 that its jails
have a primary purpose which is inconsistent with first amendment activity, but it cannot say that its public streets or public
parks may not be so used." The distinction depends in large part
upon the judiciary's evaluation of the inherent purpose of a particular location or a particular facility. This brings the inquiry back
to determining just what is the inherent purpose of the elementary
and secondary school classroom, and who makes the choice.
Clearly, in the area of the state's employees performing the state's
functions, where the inquiry is into the very performance of those
duties, the primary determination should be a legislative one as to
the functions of the public schools. There seems no compelling
reason for the first amendment to control the choice as to the
proper philosophy for elementary and secondary education in the
United States, rather than leaving this decision to the appropriate
legislative bodies. The classroom of the public school is certainly
not so fundamentally a locus for the marketplace of ideas, or the
free exchange of opinion, as is the public park, the public street,
the public auditorium, or even the college classroom. In the absence of this degree of unanimity, the determination should probably remain outside of the courts. And this conclusion is buttressed
by a general reluctance to extend first amendment protection to
speech which is actually part of the performance of the duties of
the employee. A policeman may not exercise first amendment
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 96 S. Ct. 1211 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39 (1966) (jail); Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Library of
Congress); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (Pentagon
concourse).
11Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See generally Kalven, The Concept
of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (1965); Note, The Right of Peaceful
Protest, 55 CALIF. L. Rav. 549 (1967).
88

385 U.S. 39 (1966).

Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). Compare Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965) and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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rights while investigating a crime, and few would contend that an
announcer or actor for a publicly financed television station could
claim the protection of the first amendment if he or she deviated
from the script for a particular show. Nonetheless, as this analysis
has shown, the choice as to which loci are appropriate for first
amendment activity, and which are not, is one that inevitably
involves the courts in making this choice, in order that the scope
of constitutional protection may be ascertained. So, while it may
be a basic proposition that overall control of educational philosophy and educational methods lies with the state, the first amendment is not wholly irrelevant, and thus the courts must become
involved with issues of educational philosophy and educational
methods."
The application of these principles by the courts shows the
difficulty of the problem of recognizing basic administrative authority over choices of teaching methods and teaching materials,
while not wanting to eliminate completely any possible area of
discretion by the individual teacher. At the outset, however, mention should be made of cases such as Parducciv. Rutland." In this
case, a teacher was dismissed for assigning "Monkey House," by
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., to high school juniors. While acknowledging
that "[t]his Court is keenly aware of the state's vital interest in
protecting the impressionable minds of its young people from any
form of extreme propagandism in the classroom,"7 the court then
proceeded to place the burden on the school authorities to show
that the assignment was inappropriate, or that it created a significant disruption of the educational process.' Thus, freedom in the
choice of materials was presumed to rest with the teacher, subject
to a showing of inappropriateness by the school administration, an
allocation of burdens that seems inconsistent with the true role of
the first amendment in the area of classroom teaching. Similarly,
in Keefe v. Geanakos," a high school English teacher had been
suspended for assigning an article on protest as outside reading,
and then discussing, in class, the use of the word "mother-fucker"
" See Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A
Search for Standards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837, 845-49, 859 (1974).
" 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
" Id. at 355.

11Id. at 356. Much of this was dicta, since the court also determined that the
teacher was dismissed without appropriate procedural due process safeguards.
72 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
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in that article. But the court held that the article and the class
discussion were educationally relevant, despite objections by some
parents. "With the greatest of respect to such parents, their sensi7' 3
bilities are not the full measure of what is proper education.
Read broadly, cases such as these may stand for a basic substantive right of academic freedom on the part of the teacher in the
choice of educational methods and educational materials.7 4 But
perhaps they are more properly seen as cases recognizing a degree
of academic freedom within parameters set down by school authorities. In other words, if there is no specific prohibition on the particular teaching activity, then some degree of individual choice by
the teacher is permissible.
This concept can be seen in those cases dealing with academic
freedom concurrently with the issue of proper notice. The leading
case seems to be the decision of Judge Wyzanski in Mailloux v.
Kiley.75 The teacher had been suspended for using the work "fuck"
in class, as part of a particular lesson. Judge Wyzanski distinguished the freedoms of secondary school teachers from those of
college teachers, since the high school is less of an open forum,
involves more parental interest in the specific educational process,
and involves students who are not voluntarily in class. 76 However,
there was still a qualified right to some academic freedom even as
to in-classroom teaching. This right, however, was subject to the
ultimate power of the school authorities, but this power must be
exercised by specific regulations made known in advance of the
activity upon which the disciplinary action was based. 77 Thus, notice is the primary issue, but the validity of the regulation and the
specificity required in the notice is dependent on the basic recogni7 Id. at 361-62.
'
See also Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Iowa 1972); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp.
657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); cf.
Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Oliker, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1972).
" 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), afl'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
"

Id. at 1392.

Id. Other cases raising the notice issue in this or similar contexts include
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of
Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent
School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacatedon othergrounds, 496 F.2d
(5th Cir. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Iowa 1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356-58 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
"
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tion of some degree of teacher independence. This was made clear
in the First Circuit's opinion in the same case.
[F]ree speech does not grant teachers a license to say or write
in class whatever they may feel like, and ... the propriety of
regulations "or" sanctions must depend on such circumstances
as the age and sophistication of the student, the closeness of the
relation between the specific technique used and some concededly valid educational objective, and the context and manner
of presentation.18
Thus, although the simplest view, and one certainly not without substantial justification, is that in the actual performance of
duties the teacher'does not have any rights to academic freedom,79
and that the school exercises ultimate and absolute control, 0 more
recent cases have attempted to define a carefully qualified limited
range of classroom academic freedom for the elementary and secondary school teacher. Broadly, then, the control of the school
administration is perhaps less absolute as to classroom activities
than it is as to other areas, such as the school library.8 ' Judge
Wzyanski has found a substantive right to select teaching methods
serving demonstrable educational purposes if they are either
shown to be necessary, or supported by the weight of teaching
opinion, or otherwise plainly permissible. 2 Thus, one area of inquiry must be as to whether the method used or book selected
serves a valid educational purpose.83 The determination of this
involves not only a determination of educational validity in the
abstract, but also the relevance of the methods or materials chosen
to the purposes of a particular class. Valid educational methods
lose their validity when employed to advance goals outside of the
Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971).
See Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 229-30 (D. Md.), afl'd, 348
F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966) (use of Brave New World
in the classroom not protected activity).
' See Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924)
(control over textbooks); Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W. 962 (1899) (same).
See generally Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 3,
21-23 (1961).
" See President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
11Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971).
" Lindros v. Governing Bd. of the Torrance Unified School Dist., 26 Cal. App.
3d 38, 103 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1972), rev'd, 9 Cal. 3d, 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr.
185 (1973).
'

"
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purposes of the particular educational function at issue. 4 If, then,
the methods used or the materials assigned are educationally valid
and educationally relevant, the case law seems to support the
proposition that "academic freedom implies the limited introduction of unapproved material into the classroom."8 But all of this
implies no clear abrogation of, or contradiction with clearly defined school policies. If, as the cases seem to say, and the Constitution appears to allow, the school administrator, acting on behalf
of the state, may decide issues of educational policies and educational materials and methods used, the range of academic freedom
-seems limited to that which does not result in wholesale changes
in, or exclusions of, the official curriculum." The same applies as
well to general teaching philosophy or style. Academic freedom
"does not encompass the right of a nontenured teacher to have her
teaching style insulated from review by her superiors . . . just
because her methods and philosophy are considered acceptable
87
somewhere within the teaching profession.
What this all amounts to, which is a logical extension of the
basic, although not unlimited, right of the state to decide what will
be taught in the public schools and how it will be taught,"8 is that
classroom academic freedom exists mainly within the parameters
set by the appropriate governing authority. The school administration has ultimate control over the subject matter, the materials
which will be used, and the manner in which the subject will be
11See Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Knarr
v. Board of School Trustees, 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971); Sterzing v. Fort Bend
Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Pred v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d
851 (5th Cir. 1969); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 972 (1973); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972); Robbins v.
Board of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1970); cf. Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d
1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
" Miller, Teachers' Freedomof Expression Within the Classroom;A Searchfor
Standards,8 GA. L. REv. 837, 872 (1974).
81Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973); cf. Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971), cert.
denied. 402 U.S. 972 (1972); President's Council v. Community School Bd., 457
F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Brubaker v. Board of Educ.
502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
"I Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973). See also Cook County College Teachers Union, Local No. 1600 v. Byrd, 456
F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
" See text accompanying notes 58-68 supra.
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taught. But all of this power must be exercised specifically, by
proper notice and proper procedures. To the extent, and seemingly
only to the extent, that matters are not so specifically dealt with,
the teacher has the right to select valid and relevant educational
methods and materials which are not inconsistent with overall
school goals. As so defined, of course, the extent of constitutional
protection of the teacher's in-class activities is very limited, since
it is subject to the properly exercised limitation by governing authorities, but this does not seem inappropriate. The schoolroom is
not yet so universally accepted as an open marketplace of ideas
that this concept rises to the level of a constitutional right, either
for the teacher or for the student. And in the absence of such a
right, there is nothing to preclude the school administration or
school board from making binding decisions as to teaching methods, subjects to be covered, and materials to be used.
III.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHOICE

That the choice of instructional materials and instructional
methods may constitutionally be allocated to the school authorities does not mean that the choices are completely outside of the
scope of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, the substance of the choice,
as distinguished from the locus of the choice, may involve constitutional considerations, primarily under the religion clauses of the
first amendment. Before turning to these, however, a brief discussion of the current implications of an earlier mode of analysis is
called for.
A.

Substantive Due Process

Normally, the very mention of substantive due process is
enough to scare the modem constitutional scholar, and thus any
attention to it would be surprising. It is mentioned here because
of the existence of two Supreme Court cases that, on their face,
bear strongly on the general issue under consideration. The cases
are Meyer v. Nebraska,89 and Bartels v. Iowa,9" both decided during
the high point of substantive due process. In Meyer, the Court was
called upon to review a Nebraska statute which prohibited the
teaching, in a public or private school, of any subject in any language other than English, and prohibited the teaching of foreign
"8 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

10Id. at 404.
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languages prior to the completion of the eighth grade. Bartels dealt
with similar statutes in Iowa and Ohio, as well as another case
arising out of Nebraska. All of the convictions under review involved the teaching of the German language in various parochial
schools. The purpose of the statutes was generally aimed at the
assimilation of the recent wave of immigrants, primarily German,
in the states involved. The Supreme Court, in opinions written by
Mr. Justice McReynolds, overturned the statutes as interfering
with the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Finding
that liberty included the right "to engage in any of the common
occupations of life," and that teaching was one of those occupations, the Court concluded that the teacher's right to follow the
calling of a modern language teacher, and "his right thus to teach
and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children
• . .are within the liberty of the Amendment."9 Since "[m]ere
knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded
as harmful, ' 92 the Court found the statute unconstitutional as arbitrary and not reasonably related to any valid state goal.
To the extent that Meyer stands for the proposition that the
Court will evaluate in detail the reasons for the legislation, it is
clear that it is no longer "good law."93 Of course, if a state prescribed educational requirements which were wholly without basis,
then a substantive due process claim might be successful. 4 This,
however, is highly unlikely. The arguable significance of Meyer is
its statement that there is a substantive right, found in the concept
92 Id. at 399-400.
92 Id.
" See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963). Since Meyer dealt with private schools, it is, in any event, of questionable relevance to any purported right to teach certain subjects in the public schools.
'1 An example given has been the hypothetical requirement "that all students
in eighth-grade English, as a condition precedent to successful completion of the
course, successfully make 3 parachute jumps from an altitude of at least 5,000 feet."
LeClercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption? 27
VAND. L. REV. 209, 240 n.181 (1974). Professor LeClercq implies, however, that the
same mode of analysis could be used to invalidate legislation dealing with the
teaching of creationist, as opposed to Darwinian, or evolutionary, theories of the
origin of man. But creationist theory has a widely accepted, albeit religious, basis.
The fact that that basis may be constitutionally impermissible, by virtue of the
establishment clause of the first amendment, does not make it irrational in constitutional terms. That which is constitutionally impermissible is not necessarily
lacking in any rational basis, even if it is scientifically, if not religiously, thought
to be invalid. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of liberty in the fourteenth amendment, to teach particular subjects and, therefore, perhaps also to teach in a particular manner
or with particular materials. This aspect of Meyer seems to survive, 5 but it must be looked at in its proper perspective. Virtually
every recent case dealing with the "common occupations," has
been a procedural due process case. That something may not be
taken away without notice and a hearing is a far cry from an
absolute right to engage in that activity in the public sector. What
remains of any kind of substantive liberty to teach must be found,
if at all, in and around the first amendment, a subject that has
been discussed at length in the previous section of this article.
B. The Establishment Clause of the FirstAmendment
The most important substantive restrictions on what can be
taught in the public schools seem to come from the religion clauses
of the first amendment, primarily the establishment clause, providing that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,""7 and equally applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. 8 There have been a large number of
cases decided by the Supreme Court under the establishment
clause, but few have dealt with actual instructional activities in
the public schools. Many have dealt with financial support to parochial schools,9 others have dealt with attempts to involve the
public schools in formal religious education,' ° and of course there
have been the school prayer cases."9 ' What emerges from all of
these cases is a three part test, providing that the state activity
have a plainly secular purpose, that its actual effect neither pro,5See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
" See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (attorney);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (accountant); Milligan v.
Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965); cf. Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
, U.S. CONST. amend I.
" Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan
v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'" See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
"I Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
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mote nor inhibit religion, and that there be no excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 02 The application of these general principles to instructional activities and materials in the public schools is the subject of the remainder of this section.
The most important case on the establishment issue is
Epperson v. Arkansas,"3 decided by the Supreme Court in 1968.
Epperson involved an Arkansas statute which provided for criminal penalties, as well as dismissal, for any school teacher who
taught evolutionary theories in the public schools. 4 The statute
was based on the Tennessee statute which had been upheld in the
famous Scopes "monkey trial." ' 5 Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Fortas reaffirmed the state's basic right to prescribe the curriculum for the public schools, which would clearly include the study
of religion and the Bible from literary and historic viewpoints.'
But in making these curricular decisions, the state must be religiously neutral. It cannot promote or inhibit any religious view, or
promote or inhibit religion. This statute violated the establishment clause, as well as the free exercise clause, 07 since it was
enacted to promote a particular religious view, and in fact would
have that effect.
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body
of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group. 00
Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
204 The suit had been commenced as a declaratory judgment action by a
teacher. The statute itself had never been enforced.
10 Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). See generally LeClercq,
The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption? 27 VAND. L.
REV. 209 (1974). For general background on the issues in the Scopes trial, see the
authorities cited id. at n.2.
202

20

393 U.S. at 106-107.

The free exercise clause and the establishment clause may overlap in their
prohibitions in situations, such as this, where the establishment of religion, in a
coercive environment such as a public school, also has the effect of preventing the
free exercise of contrary beliefs, such as the belief that evolutionary theory is wrong,
or that school prayers are not the appropriate way to worship. Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
'1 393 U.S. at 103 (footnote omitted). Epperson was followed in Smith v. State,
242 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1970). An attempt to draft an "equal time" statute which
required a "disclaimer" on textbooks dealing with evolution, and required the
"o
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The key point of Eppersonis its inquiry into the religious purpose
of the Arkansas statute. While legislative purpose is not relevant
in all areas of constitutional law, 0 ' its function in establishment
clause cases is important, since virtually all legislation may be said
to affect someone's religious beliefs in some way."' Where the law's
purpose is plain from the very prohibition or requirement, as in the
school prayer cases, the inquiry into purpose may be unnecessary.
But other cases present harder problems. Thus, an attack on the
teaching of evolution, as constituting the establishment of an atheistic, sectarian religion, was rejected because the practice had an
educational and scientific, rather than a religious, purpose."' Similarly, sex education courses and materials, although offensive to
some religious groups, do not constitute an establishment of religion since their purpose is based on educational, and not religious
(or anti-religious) goals."'
The issue of government entanglement with religion is unlikely to be significant in most establishment clause cases involving school books and subjects taught. And while many books or
classes might have some effect which incidentally promotes or inhibits a particular religious viewpoint, this too is not likely to be
teaching of the Genesis theory if the Darwinian theory was taught was rejected in
Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. deniedsub nom., Brown v. Houston Independent School Dist., 417 U.S.
969 (1974). "If this approach were applied in other areas, teachers might be obliged
to provide equal time for an exposition of the Mormon belief in the inequality of
the races, and for indoctrination in the Christian Science view of health and disease." 366 F. Supp. at 1211 n.6.
'
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
11 The Supreme Court has held that a statute's original religious purpose may
be superseded by the current reason for its continuance. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding validity of Sunday closing laws).
"' Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex.
1972), afl'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, sub nom., Brown v. Houston
Independent School Dist., 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
"I Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969) afl'd, 428
F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw.
436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970). Similarly, a state law prohibiting the classroom discussion
of birth control has been upheld since, unlike the Epperson prohibition, this prohibition did not have a religious purpose, even though it had the effect of assisting
those religions opposed to birth control. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ.,
379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 419 U.S. 281 (1975). See
Recent Developments- Constitutional Law-Church and State-Freedom of
Religion, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1050 (1970).
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the determining consideration. Rather, the purpose of the statute,
however it may be determined, will most often provide the controlling consideration. Courses or books dealing with sex, or those
discussing religion in some way, are destined to promote some
religious beliefs and to suppress others. But if they are based on
valid educational goals, unrelated to religion, and do not select
viewpoints for religious reasons, then they seem to create no establishment clause problem.
C. The Free Exercise Clause
It is possible that certain school books, or courses, or methods
of instruction, may offend the religious beliefs of the students involved, and there are thus created significant issues under the free
exercise clause"' of the first amendment, to the extent that compulsory activities in compulsory schools may force students to violate their religious convictions. The Supreme Court has never
faced this issue in the context of actual classroom instruction per
se, but two cases are nonetheless instructive. In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,"4 the Court held that the
children of Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled to salute
the flag in school, since the significance of forced oath to the Jehovah's Witnesses was not outweighed by the state's interest in promoting loyalty."'
Of even greater relevance is the relatively recent case of
Wisconsin v. Yoder."' Wisconsin, like most states, had a statute
which required school attendance to the age of sixteen. This conflicted with the practice of the Amish religion of not sending children to school past the eighth grade. In a decision written by Chief
Justice Burger, the Court held that Amish children could not be
compelled to attend school past the eighth grade. The significance
of the case lies in the fact that normally, the free exercise clause
"I See generally Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 327 (1969).
'" 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Jackson, J.), overruling Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
"I Lower court cases following Barnette include Banks v. Board of Public
Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 401
U.S. 988 (1971), aff'd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Frain v. Barron, 307 F. Supp.
27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
1" 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See Knudsen, The Education of the Amish Child, 62
CALIF L. REV. 1506 (1974).
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has been held to apply to religious beliefs, and not to conduct,"'
and in the general reluctance of the courts to inquire into the
validity of religious beliefs."' But Yoder was based on a finding by
the Court that, in balancing the respective interests, the fundamental religious beliefs involved outweighed the state's interest in
compelling two additional years of schooling. Thus, the Amish
objected, concededly sincerely, to higher education not only because of the "worldly" things that were taught, but also because
of the very concept of the school, involving a competitive environment, being away from the home and the land at a time when such
was religiously necessary, and other factors. These principles were
found to be fundamental to the Amish religion's, "basic religious
tenets and practices" which were inseparable from the religious
beliefs of the Amish." '9
Thus, while neutrality on the part of the state might suffice
to meet the requirements of the establishment clause, this neutrality may still impair the free exercise of religion, requiring that
those affected be given the opportunity to avoid the governmental
compulsion.'20 But the Yoder "exception" is extremely narrow. The
claims must be religious in origin, based on "deep religious convictions," be shared by an organized group, and be intimately related
to daily living. Furthermore, the claims must be based on an aversion to activity that goes to the very heart of the religious beliefs
involved.'' If these conditions are met, then a child may have the
right to be excused from classes or the use of materials which are
religiously offensiv6 tothat child.'" This would seem to apply, for
example, to the right of Catholic children to be excused from
classes discussing birth control or abortion. There may very well
be other examples, but since the validity of the claim to the right
to be excused depends upon the relationship of the activity to
particular religious beliefs, discussion of which claims might be
upheld seems beyond the abilities of this writer. Also the balancing
"I See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy statutes
upheld despite objections of Mormons); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944).
"' Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
406 U.S. at 218-20.
Id. at 220-21.
"I

Id. at 216-18.

Of course, the right of the individual to be excused will prevent a free
exercise attack, but does not remedy an establishment of religion. See Medeiros v.
Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970).
11
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process involves an evaluation of the importance of the particular
material from which the student is excused, and thus different
considerations may compel different results depending on the
exact instructional material or process involved.
IV.

THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS OR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN?

Clearly, if there is a right to be excused, under some circumstances, from saluting the flag, or going to school, or attending
certain classes, then this right must be exercised either by the
parent or the child. Who, as between parent and child, can exercise
the choice, presents an extremely troublesome issue.'23 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the Court mentioned the issue but felt it need
not decide it, since the record did not suggest that any child of
the parents involved had desired to attend school past the eighth
grade.'1 The Court did, however, reject the parens patriae claim
of the state that it, rather than the parents, should decide what is
educationally best for the child.' 6 Certainly, in some areas, the
wishes of parents are not controlling, where the best interests of the.
child are to be sacrificed.'1 If the wishes of the parent and the child
are the same, then, as in Yoder, the parens patriae argument is
subsumed under the balancing of religious beliefs against state
interest, for if the balance is in favor of the religious interests, then
the interests of the state, parenspatriae,have already been considered. But if the interests of the parent and the child are different,
then the problem becomes harder. We clearly accept, as a general
proposition, that control over the educational and religious upbringing of children rests with the parents. But it is the child who
benefits, after the age of majority, from the education he or she is
given prior to that age. Obviously, the situation may arise in one
of two ways. The parent may wish to keep the child in a class which
the child, for religious reasons, chooses not to attend, or the parent
"1See generally Moskowitz, ParentalRights and State Education, 50 WASH.

L. REv. 623 (1975).

See text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
406 U.S. at 229-34. Compare the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas on this issue,
id. at 241-46.
121406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"

2I Id. at 229-34.

12See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), upholding the power
of the state to prohibit the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from selling religious
pamphlets on the street, despite the religiously based wishes of the parents.
'" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944).
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may wish to keep the child out of a class which the child, for
educational reasons, wishes to attend.' Since it is a balancing
process which is involved, the resolution of these two situations
might not be the same, if the concept of children's rights irrespective of the wishes of the parents is accepted in this area. The age
of the child is also a significant factor. But since a full exploration
of this issue involves problems far beyond the scope of this article,
and since issues of the control by parents over children are of
greater legal magnitude than those relating solely to the educational process, no solution will be suggested here. The issue, however, is one that must at least be considered in dealing with this
area.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has dealt with a wide variety of legal problems
relating to the instructional process in elementary and secondary
public schools. None admit of easy solutions, and, in all, the current case law is unsettled. But by separating the distinct constitutional problems involved, and recognizing the often conflicting
rights and interests of the states, of teachers, of parents, and of
children, solutions may be easier to find. It is all too easy to talk
of abstract rights, such as academic freedom and religious freedom, without placing them in the proper context. And it is equally
easy to defer to the courts for all of these problems, without realizing that courts are clearly not the institutions best suited to running the schools. Courts are, however, the institutions best suited
to making determinations of constitutional rights, and the nature
of the educational process is such that the periodic intervention of
the courts is inevitable. The development of consistent and reasoned methods of analysis in the areas discussed in this article
should help to reduce the number of occasions in which courts
intervene in the educational process and increase the effectiveness
of judicial decisions on those occasions when the courts must intervene.
,' Another possibility is that the religious views of the parents are not shared
by the child, but the child would like to take advantage of the parents' religious
views so as to avoid the requirement. But since the inquiry, under Yoder, is based
not so much on individual beliefs as on the fundamental tenets of the religion, this
problem seems nonjusticiable.
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